Niger-France relations: Nuclear giant Orano loses control of uranium operations to junta

In the most recent signal of a dramatic deterioration in relations, Niger’s navy rulers seem more and more decided to drive France out of any important sector of their financial system – and notably uranium mining.

This week the French state nuclear firm Orano introduced that the junta – which deposed France’s ally, President Mohamed Bazoum, in a coup in July 2023 – had taken operational management of its native mining agency, Somaïr.

The firm’s efforts to renew exports have for months been blocked by the regime and it’s being pushed into monetary disaster.

And the impression might be felt extra extensively – though Niger accounts for lower than 5% of the uranium produced globally, in 2022 it accounted for 1 / 4 of the availability to nuclear energy vegetation throughout Europe.

So the timing may hardly be extra awkward, as Western international locations battle to satisfy the problem of local weather change and lower their carbon emissions from electrical energy technology.

For French President Emmanuel Macron, already wrestling with political disaster at dwelling, the potential departure of Orano from Niger is definitely awkward in picture phrases.

For it coincides with bruising information from different long-standing African companions – Chad has immediately introduced the ending of a defence settlement with Paris, whereas Senegal has confirmed its insistence on the eventual closure of the French navy base in Dakar.

But in any case, the disaster going through Orano in Niger represents a major sensible problem for French vitality provide.

With 18 nuclear vegetation, totalling 56 reactors, which generate virtually 65% of its electrical energy, France has been forward of the sport in containing carbon emissions from the facility sector.

But the nation’s personal restricted manufacturing of uranium ended greater than 20 years in the past.

So, over the previous decade or so, it has imported virtually 90,000 tonnes – a fifth of which has come from Niger. Only Kazakhstan – which accounts for 45% of world output – was a extra essential supply of provide.

The persevering with paralysis, or the definitive shutdown, of Orano’s operations in Niger will surely drive France to look elsewhere.

This must be achievable, as different provides may be obtained from international locations together with Uzbekistan, Australia and Namibia.

Last 12 months, as West African neighbours responded to the coup in Niger by imposing a commerce blockade that paralysed uranium exports, different suppliers readily stepped into the breach.

The European Union’s imports of the mineral from the nation plunged by a 3rd, however these have been largely changed by Canada.

But there was additionally a politically awkward worth to pay. EU imports of uranium from Russia rose by greater than 70%, regardless of the heavy sanctions imposed on Moscow due to its invasion of Ukraine.

And in fact, it’s Russia which has change into the brand new finest buddy of the navy leaders who’ve seized energy in Niger and its allied neighbours, Burkina Faso and Mali, since 2020.

Russian navy contractors combat alongside the Malian military in its marketing campaign towards jihadists and ethnic Tuareg separatists, whereas additionally they assist to guard the senior management of the juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso.

So though France, and Europe extra usually, would be capable of discover methods to deal with a definitive lack of Niger’s uranium provide, the shift wouldn’t be totally snug.

In the short-term at the least, EU states would most likely change into extra reliant on Russia and its central Asian neighbours, thus undermining their very own effort to keep up financial strain on President Vladimir Putin throughout a doubtlessly essential interval within the Ukraine disaster.

Moreover, Niger’s regime, whose perspective in direction of the EU as a complete has change into virtually as mistrustful as its damaged relationship with France, continues to hunt alternate options to its previous Western partnerships.

And Iran – a possible buyer, in fact, for uranium – has emerged as an possibility.

Contacts between the 2 governments have deepened, with Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine visiting Tehran in January. Rumours of a doable deal for the availability of uranium “yellowcake” (focus) briefly circulated a number of months in the past.

Meanwhile, the outlook for Orano’s hopes of restoring regular uranium operations and exports from Niger look dim, given the hostile perspective of the navy regime in Niamey.

That antipathy is partly defined by Macron’s vocal condemnation of the July 2023 overthrow of Bazoum, who had been certainly one of his closest African political and safety companions.

Paris firmly endorsed the robust stance of the West African regional grouping Ecowas, and there have been even rumours that it may need been prepared to supply tacit assist had the bloc ever gone forward with its short-lived menace to intervene militarily in Niger to reinstate Bazoum.

In this toxic environment of hostility and distrust, Orano was an apparent and handy goal for junta retaliation.

The French firm’s predominant position within the uranium sector had for years fuelled resentment amongst many Nigériens, amidst claims that the French firm was shopping for their uranium on a budget, regardless of periodic renegotiations of the export deal. Although the mining operations solely began years after independence, they have been seen as emblematic of France’s ongoing post-colonial affect.

After final 12 months’s coup, Orano itself tried to remain out of the diplomatic row, maintain a low profile and keep on working usually.

But the Ecowas commerce blockade prevented it from exporting the output from the Somaïr mine, close to Arlit, within the Sahara Desert.

And even after the sanctions have been lifted in late February, the standard uranium export route, through Benin’s port of Cotonou, remained blocked, as a result of the junta saved the border closed in an ongoing political row with Benin.

Orano provided to fly the uranium out, however the regime shunned this suggestion.

In June the junta cancelled the French firm’s rights to develop a brand new mine on the giant Imouraren deposit, which had been seen because the uranium sector’s principal new hope for future development.

Meanwhile, the export blockage was pushing Somaïr, which by November was sitting on 1,150 tonnes of blockaded shares of uranium focus value $210m (£165m), into monetary disaster.

And when Orano determined to halt additional manufacturing and prioritise the fee of workforce salaries, relations with the federal government deteriorated additional into this week’s virtually whole breakdown.

Of course, it’s not simply the corporate but additionally Niger’s financial system that pays a worth for this example, in misplaced export earnings and risking lots of of jobs.

For Arlit and different communities within the desert north, this could be a devastating blow, regardless of discuss of revived exercise at a Chinese mining venture within the area and a few curiosity within the sector amongst different potential companions.

But Niger’s junta feels no must make concessions to Orano as a result of it’s now buoyed by a pointy rise in oil exports, because of a brand new Chinese-built pipeline.

With that monetary cushion, the regime seems ready to bear the price of paralysing and doubtless dismantling the normal uranium partnership with France – now its most important worldwide opponent.

Paul Melly is a consulting fellow with the Africa Programme at Chatham House in London.