How Syria rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani reinvented himself

Syrian insurgent chief Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani has dropped that nom de guerre related together with his jihadist previous, and been utilizing his actual identify, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official communiques issued since Thursday, forward of the autumn of President Bashar al-Assad.

This transfer is a part of Jawlani’s effort to bolster his legitimacy in a brand new context, as his Islamist militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), main different insurgent factions, publicizes the seize of the Syrian capital, Damascus, solidifying its management over a lot of the nation.

Jawlani’s transformation isn’t current, however has been rigorously cultivated through the years, evident not solely in his public statements and interviews with worldwide shops but additionally in his evolving look.

Once clad in conventional jihadist militant apparel, he has adopted a extra Western-style wardrobe prior to now years. Now, as he leads the offensive, he has donned army fatigues, symbolising his position because the commander of the operations room.

But who’s Jawlani – or Ahmed al-Sharaa – and why and the way has he modified?

A 2021 PBS interview with Jawlani revealed that he was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, the place his father labored as an oil engineer till 1989.

In that yr, the Jawlani household returned to Syria, the place he grew up and lived within the Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus.

Jawlani’s journey as a jihadist started in Iraq, linked to al-Qaeda by the Islamic State (IS) group’s precursor – al-Qaeda in Iraq and, later, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

After the 2003 US-led invasion, he joined different international fighters in Iraq and, in 2005, was imprisoned at Camp Bucca, the place he enhanced his jihadist affiliations and in a while was launched to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the quiet scholar who would later go on to guide IS.

In 2011, Baghdadi despatched Jawlani to Syria with funding to ascertain al-Nusra Front, a covert faction tied to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had turn into a distinguished Syrian combating power, hiding its IS and al-Qaeda ties.

Tensions arose in 2013 when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unilaterally declared the merger of the 2 teams (ISI and Nusra), declaring the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and publicly revealing for the primary time the hyperlinks between them.

Jawlani resisted, as he wished to distance his group from ISI’s violent techniques, resulting in a cut up.

To get out of that sticky scenario, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian department.

From the beginning, he prioritised profitable Syrian help, distancing himself from IS’s brutality and emphasising a extra pragmatic strategy to jihad.

In April 2013, al-Nusra Front turned al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, placing it at odds with IS.

While Jawlani’s transfer was partly an try to take care of native help and keep away from alienating Syrians and insurgent factions, the al-Qaeda affiliation finally did little to profit this effort.

It turned a urgent problem in 2015 when Nusra and different factions captured Idlib province, forcing them to co-operate in its administration.

In 2016, Jawlani severed ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.

While initially showing superficial, the cut up revealed deeper divisions. Al-Qaeda accused Jawlani of betrayal, resulting in defections and the formation of Hurras al-Din, a brand new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS later crushed in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, nevertheless, have remained cautiously current within the area.

HTS additionally focused IS operatives and international fighters in Idlib, dismantling their networks and forcing some to bear “deradicalisation” programmes.

These strikes, justified as efforts to unify militant forces and scale back infighting, signalled Jawlani’s technique to place HTS as a dominant and politically viable power in Syria.

Despite the general public cut up from al-Qaeda and identify modifications, HTS continued to be designated by the UN, US, UK and different international locations as a terrorist organisation, and the US maintained a $10m reward for details about Jawlani’s whereabouts. Western powers thought of the break-up to be a façade.

Under Jawlani, HTS turned the dominant power in Idlib, north-west Syria’s largest insurgent stronghold and residential to about 4 million folks, lots of whom had been displaced from different Syrian provinces.

To handle considerations a few militant group governing the realm, HTS established a civilian entrance, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.

The SG functioned like a state, with a chief minister, ministries and native departments overseeing sectors resembling training, well being and reconstruction, whereas sustaining a non secular council guided by Sharia, or Islamic regulation.

To reshape his picture, Jawlani actively engaged with the general public, visiting displacement camps, attending occasions, and overseeing help efforts, significantly throughout crises just like the 2023 earthquakes.

HTS highlighted achievements in governance and infrastructure to legitimise its rule and show its potential to offer stability and companies.

It has beforehand praised the Taliban, upon their return to energy in 2021, lauding them as an inspiration and a mannequin for successfully balancing jihadist efforts with political aspirations, together with making tactical compromises to attain their objectives.

Jawlani’s efforts in Idlib mirrored his broader technique to show HTS’s potential not solely to wage jihad but additionally to manipulate successfully.

By prioritising stability, public companies and reconstruction, he aimed to showcase Idlib as a mannequin of success below HTS rule, enhancing each his group’s legitimacy and his personal political aspirations.

But below his management, HTS has crushed and marginalised different militant factions, each jihadists and insurgent ones, in its effort to consolidate its energy and dominate the scene.

For over a yr main as much as the HTS-led insurgent offensive on 27 November, Jawlani confronted protests in Idlib from hardline Islamists in addition to Syrian activists.

Critics in contrast his rule to Assad’s, accusing HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters labelled HTS’s safety forces as “Shabbiha”, a time period used to explain Assad’s loyalist henchmen.

They additional alleged that HTS intentionally prevented significant fight in opposition to authorities forces and marginalised jihadists and international fighters in Idlib to forestall them from partaking in such actions, all to appease worldwide actors.

Even through the newest offensive, activists have persistently urged HTS to launch people imprisoned in Idlib allegedly for expressing dissent.

In response to those criticisms, HTS initiated a number of reforms over the previous yr. It disbanded or rebranded a controversial safety power accused of human rights violations and established a “Department of Grievances” to permit residents to lodge complaints in opposition to the group. Its critics mentioned these measures had been only a present to comprise dissent.

To justify its consolidation of energy in Idlib and the suppression of plurality amongst militant teams, HTS argued that unifying below a single management was essential for making progress and finally overthrowing the Syrian authorities.

HTS and its civilian arm, the SG, walked a tightrope, striving to venture a contemporary, reasonable picture to win over each the native inhabitants and the worldwide group, whereas concurrently sustaining their Islamist identification to fulfill hardliners inside rebel-held areas and HTS’s personal ranks.

For occasion, in December 2023, HTS and the SG confronted a backlash after a “festival” held at a shiny new shopping center was criticised by hardliners as “immoral”.

And this August, a Paralympic Games-inspired ceremony drew sharp criticism from hardliners, prompting the SG to evaluate the organisation of such occasions.

These incidents illustrate the challenges HTS faces in reconciling the expectations of its Islamist base with the broader calls for of the Syrian inhabitants, who’re searching for freedom and coexistence after years of authoritarian rule below Assad.

As the most recent offensive unfolded, international media centered on Jawlani’s jihadist previous, prompting some insurgent supporters to name for him to step again, viewing him as a legal responsibility.

Although he beforehand expressed willingness to dissolve his group and step apart, his current actions and public appearances inform a distinct story.

HTS’s success in uniting rebels and practically capturing the entire nation in below two weeks has strengthened Jawlani’s place, quieting hardline critics and accusations of opportunism.

Jawlani and the SG have since reassured home and worldwide audiences.

To Syrians, together with minorities, they promised security; to neighbours and powers like Russia, they pledged peaceable relations. Jawlani even assured Russia its Syrian bases would stay unhurt if assaults ceased.

This shift displays HTS’s “moderate jihad” technique since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over inflexible ideology.

Jawlani’s strategy might sign the decline of worldwide jihad actions like IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is more and more seen as ineffective and unsustainable.

His trajectory may encourage different teams to adapt, marking both a brand new period of localised, politically versatile “jihadism” or only a momentary divergence from the standard path so as to make political and territorial positive aspects.